Hadronic B Decays at BABAR and BELLE

We review recent results of the BABAR and BELLE Collaborations on the the alpha and gamma angles of the unitary triangle, on the B to K pi pi Dalitz-plot analyses, and on the searches for baryonic B decays and for B to DD decays.Comment: SLAC-PUB-13240. To appear in the Proceedings of "Rencontres de Moriond QCD and High Energy Interactions", La Thuile (Italy) March 8-15, 200

Diboson production cross section at LHC

This paper presents an overview of the diboson production cross-section measurements and constraints on anomalous triple-gauge boson couplings performed by the ATLAS and CMS collaborations using proton-proton collisions produced at a centre-of-mass energy of sqrt{s} = 7 and 8 TeV at LHC. Results for all combinations of W, Z and \gamma\ gauge bosons (excluding \gamma\gamma) are presented with emphasis on the new WZ and ZZ production cross sections measured by ATLAS at sqrt{s} = 8 TeV and on the new constraints on anomalous triple-gauge couplings set by CMS in the WW and Z\gamma\ modes.Comment: 4 pages, 6 figures. Rencontres de Moriond QCD and High Energy Interactions 201

Growth and inequality effects on poverty reduction in Italy

This paper deals with the evaluation of poverty sensitivity to growth and distributional changes in Italy, across its regions and over a three- decade period, spanning from 1977 to 2004. We use the "Survey on Household Income and Wealth" (SHIW) of the Bank of Italy to firstly construct growth incidence curves. After estimating the size income distribution, we evaluate the income and the inequality elasticities of poverty. Growth strongly determines the patterns of poverty; however, inequality appears to have strikingly characterized it as well. The difference between North, Centre and South can be due to the different income elasticity of poverty, which in turn depends on the initial conditions of inequality and level of development.-

Poor’s behaviour and inequality traps: the role of human capital

We evaluate whether and how the persistence of inequality and the presence of inequality traps carry over the persistence of poverty and possible aggregate economic inefficiencies. We propose a microeconomic formalization of one possible definition of poverty and of the behaviour of poor and rich agents. Poverty is defined as lack of or low societal participation, which is source of both a direct private benefit and an indirect gain. Analysing poverty under the individual rational choice, we are able to endogeneize the threshold amount of the participation good needed to join the additional indirect benefit as well as the threshold level of income - the poverty line - needed to buy that amount; further we find the conditions for their existence which in turn determine also their level. In an overlapping generation structure we show that in economies starting largely poor two equilibria exist; one low locally stable equilibrium to which low and middle-income class converge and one upper locally unstable over the which richer classes of income enter an explosive path, with unbounded growth rates of personal income. In the rich regime the whole population enter the explosive path, with unbounded growth rates. We are able to enrich the dynamics a là Galor and Zeira (1993) in an economic environment with perfect capital markets, instead of the assumption of markets imperfections, by introducing a methodological innovation which connects the presence of the externality in the human capital accumulation of the children directly to the preference of parents. By further restricting the functional form of the initial income distribution to be lognormal we find that the mean income and the variance (i.e. inequality) of the richer part of the distribution are always higher than the ones of the lower part; moreover, while within the poor class inequality tends to zero in the very long-run, within the richer class inequality is increasing at an increasing rate. Finally, a negative relation between initial inequality and economic growth is observed. The inequality traps which cause the poor regime to emerge are also sources of aggregate economic inefficiencies, which can be eliminated by reducing income disparities accordingly.Poverty, economic growth, inequality traps, human capital, endogenous preference

Poor's behaviour and inequality traps: the role of human capital

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Dual Economy Models: A Primer for…Growth, Income Distribution and Poverty Analysis

Dual economy, poverty, inequality, human capital, informal sector

Social inclusion and the emergence of development traps

This paper argues that individual concerns for relative position contribute to the emergence of development traps. It demonstrates that changes in the mean and the distribution of income qualitatively modify individual reference groups by affecting the magnitude of the reference standard. Over time, this effect influences the dynamical transition of within-dynasty incomes and drives the emergence of development traps. In particular, an increase in mean income and a reduction of inequality cause an increase in the reference standard, inducing, in the long-run, the transition from a Solovian-type stage to a development traps regime as agents need to sacrifice relatively more resources in order to keep up with the reference group.Social inclusion, keeping up with the Joneses, development traps, unified growth theory.

Income distribution and Growth: A Critical Survey

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Social inclusion through social status and the emergence of development traps

This paper investigates the long-run implications of concerns for status when heterogeneous agents care about their relative consumption with respect to an endogenous benchmark consumption of their reference group. Agents endogenously choose whether to enter the rat race to consume the benchmark level of a social participation, status, good to gain access to socially advantaged and privileged groups because relative consumption determines agents’ relative position in society which is ultimately instrumental in the accumulation of wealth and absolute consumption. The dynamical analysis predicts that increases in mean incomes and reductions in inequality over the long-run process of development foster the competition for status, raise the cost of access to the reference group and drive the onset of multiple stable steady-state equilibria. This mechanism governs the endogenous transition from a Solovian-type stage to a development traps equilibrium at which the poorest dynasties are excluded from the reference group and trapped in a low-income stable equilibrium while the richest dynasties strive to differentiate themselves from the poorest ones to reap the economic benefits of the elite position in society